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ABSTRACT: In their recent article, “Why lockdown of the elderly is not ageist and 
why levelling down equality is wrong”, Savulescu and Cameron argue for selective 
isolation of the elderly as an alternative to general lockdown. An important part of 
their argument is the claim that the latter amounts to "levelling down equality" and 
that this is "unethical" or even "morally repugnant". This response argues that they 
fail to justify either part of this claim: the claim that levelling down is always morally 
wrong is subject to challenges that Savulescu and Cameron do not consider; and a 
policy of maintaining general lockdown does not constitute levelling down, as it 
provides absolute benefits to those who would be worse off under selective isolation. 
 
The policy of lockdown, which in various forms has been imposed by governments across the 
world in order to control the spread of COVID-19, has grave consequences for liberty and 
wellbeing, both directly and through its catastrophic economic effects. As countries work 
towards easing lockdown they must balance these effects against the harms caused by 
COVID-19 itself. In a recent article, “Why lockdown of the elderly is not ageist and why 
levelling down equality is wrong”,[1] Savulescu and Cameron defend selective isolation of 
the elderly as an alternative to continuing with a general lockdown. They argue that the 
selective policy may be effective in preventing the healthcare system from being 
overwhelmed and reducing deaths, and that while it discriminates against the elderly it does 
not do so unjustly. An important part of their argument is the claim that continuing with a 
general lockdown amounts to “levelling down equality” and that this is “unethical” (p.1) or 
even “morally repugnant” (p.5). I argue that they fail to justify either part of this claim. 
In the literature, the concept of levelling down appears mainly as part of an argument against 
what is known as telic egalitarianism: the view that equality is intrinsically good. The 
levelling down argument asserts that telic egalitarianism is implausible because it is 
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committed to the view that there is something valuable about increasing equality even when 
this involves some people becoming worse off and nobody becoming better off.[2] The usual 
form of the argument is not that levelling down is always wrong, because pluralist 
egalitarians can avoid this commitment by maintaining that, in cases of levelling down, the 
goodness of increased equality is outweighed by the loss of some other value. Rather, the 
argument is that it is counter-intuitive to think that there is anything good about levelling 
down. If there is nothing good about levelling down, and always something bad about it (a 
reduction in the aggregate of whatever good is being levelled down), this may appear to 
support Savulescu and Cameron’s contention that levelling down is always morally wrong.  
This claim can, however, be challenged. Temkin, for example, argues that the levelling down 
objection depends for its rhetorical force on what Parfit calls the Person-affecting Claim—the 
claim that a situation cannot be worse (or better) than another unless there is someone for 
whom it is worse (or better)—and that this claim is itself problematic in a variety of contexts 
and lacking theoretical support.[3] According to Temkin, we should reject both the Person-
affecting Claim and the claim that levelling down is not in any respect good. Savulescu and 
Cameron do not address this or any other arguments about the intuition underlying the 
levelling down argument, but simply adopt it as a premise. This, however, is not the main 
argument that I want to make here. Instead, I will challenge Savulescu and Cameron’s claim 
that the choice to maintain a general lockdown, rather than easing it for the young while 
maintaining it for the elderly, is an instance of levelling down.  
Levelling down occurs when people become more equal in some respect because the better-
off are made worse off while nobody is made better off. This is what Savulescu and Cameron 
claim is happening if we decide to maintain a general lockdown in preference to a lockdown 
of only the elderly (or more generally, those at most risk to themselves and of burdening 
health services). “Isolation”, they write, “can have adverse mental and physical effects on the 
elderly”; but under general lockdown everyone is experiencing these effects, so “to argue that 
low-risk people should not be released from lockdown because of these effects on the elderly 
is to advocate levelling down equality. If not everyone can have the benefit [of release from 
lockdown], no one shall” (p.4). In this respect, Savulescu and Cameron view the maintaining 
of general lockdown as analogous to achieving equality for the blind by making everyone 
blind or curing nobody’s cancer because we cannot cure everyone’s (p.3). 
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This, however, is a mischaracterisation of the situation with respect to lockdown. Maintaining 
a general lockdown does not simply impose burdens on the young in order to equalise them 
with the elderly, who would have to be locked down anyway for their own or society’s 
benefit. Con the contrary, maintaining a level of general lockdown can reduce burdens or 
risks for the elderly. 
Firstly, general lockdown, if it is successful, will result in lower levels of infection in the 
general population compared to a lockdown of only the elderly. This means that when elderly 
and vulnerable people do exit their homes for whatever limited reasons the lockdown rules 
permit, or when carers or other service providers visit them in their homes, or when they 
handle or consume goods that are delivered to them in their homes, they will be less likely to 
contract COVID-19, and therefore at less risk of becoming ill or dying themselves as well as 
being less likely to become a burden on the health service, than they would be if only they 
were locked down. These are not trivial considerations, as the high level of deaths in care 
homes attests. 
Secondly, depending on the circumstances, a general lockdown may result in a more rapid 
lowering of levels and rates of infection to the point where lockdown restrictions can be 
eased for everyone, including the elderly and vulnerable. The purpose of lockdown, on 
Savulescu and Cameron’s own account, is to reduce mortality and the risk of the health 
service being overwhelmed. General lockdown is likely to bring these factors down to 
acceptable levels more quickly than a selective lockdown, and thus shorten the required 
duration of restrictions for everyone. Savulescu and Cameron may argue that even when this 
threshold is reached, the elderly would need to remain isolated for their own protection. 
However (leaving aside the question of whether it is justifiable to isolate the elderly for 
paternalistic rather than public health reasons), there will be some level of infection at which 
isolating the elderly for their own good is no longer necessary, and this is likely to be reached 
quicker if a general lockdown is maintained for longer, rather than switching to selective 
lockdown of the elderly.  
These considerations demonstrate that maintaining a general lockdown in preference to 
selective lockdown of the elderly and vulnerable need not only equalise the burdens by 
making the young and healthy worse off, but can benefit the elderly in absolute as well as 
relative terms. Their risk of illness and death may be lower even while in lockdown, and the 
duration of lockdown that they must endure may be shorter.  Therefore, it is inaccurate to 
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describe maintaining general lockdown as an instance of levelling down, so even if we accept 
Savulescu and Cameron’s assertion of the wrongness or moral repugnance of levelling down, 
it does not follow that these judgements apply to the policy in question.  
Savulescu and Cameron are right to say that there is an issue of proportionality to be 
considered. The benefits to the elderly and vulnerable of maintaining a general lockdown 
need to be balanced against the potentially much greater aggregate burden that it imposes on 
others. But one does not have to hold that levelling down is valuable in itself to think that 
such a policy might be justified. For one thing, as Savulescu and Cameron acknowledge, the 
burdens of lockdown may be greater for the elderly than for others, as they may be more 
socially isolated, and will endure the loss of liberties and social contacts for a larger fraction 
(and perhaps all even all) of their remaining life. But even if the balance of benefits and 
burdens is such that the policy of maintaining general lockdown is not justified in utilitarian 
terms, it might well be justified by what Parfit calls the Priority View, which holds that 
benefiting people matters more the worse off they are. The appeal the Priority View over 
other forms of egalitarianism is precisely that it is not committed to the view that levelling 
down is in any way valuable.  
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